The ability of a reinforcer to maintain behavior decreases as a hyperbolic function of its delay. This discounted value can help explain impulsivity defined as the choice of an immediate, small reinforcer over a delayed, large reinforcer. Human operant studies using consumable reinforcers such as videos have found impulsivity with delays under 1 min . However, measures of discounting rates using questionnaires that dElscribe hypothetical amounts of monetary reinforcers and delays of days, months, or years have found discounting rates that are much too low to explain impulsive choice in operant procedures. A comparison of discounting rates across questionnaire and operant studies indicates that questionnaires produce slower discounting because of the absence of both reinforcement and consumption processes. Combining reinforcement with questions about future reinforcers could facilitate the integration of questionnaire research into a behavioral framework.
The ability of a reinforcer to maintain behavior decreases as a hyperbolic function of its delay. This discounted value can help explain impulsivity defined as the choice of an immediate, small reinforcer over a delayed, large reinforcer. Human operant studies using consumable reinforcers such as videos have found impulsivity with delays under 1 min . However, measures of discounting rates using questionnaires that dElscribe hypothetical amounts of monetary reinforcers and delays of days, months, or years have found discounting rates that are much too low to explain impulsive choice in operant procedures. A comparison of discounting rates across questionnaire and operant studies indicates that questionnaires produce slower discounting because of the absence of both reinforcement and consumption processes. Combining reinforcement with questions about future reinforcers could facilitate the integration of questionnaire research into a behavioral framework.
The ability of a reinforcer to maintain behavior generally decreases the longer the reinforcer is withheld after thEl behavior occurs. This decrease in reinforcer value over time is known as delay (or temporal) discounting. The precise form of the relationship and the methodology for investigating it have received considerable attention in connection with behavioral theories of impulsivity. In contrast to psychiatric theories, which view impulsivity as a predisposition toward a pattern of behavior (Moeller, Barrat, Dougherty, Schmitz, & Swann, 2001) , behavioral theories view impulsivity as a specific choice response in a situation defined mainly by two parameters, amount and delay of reinforcement (Ainslie, 1975; Navarick & Fantino, 1976) . Consistent choice of an immediate, small reinforcer over a delayed, large reinforcer represents impulsivity; the opposite preference represents self-control. A behavioral analysis implies that the same individual may exhibit impulsivity or selfcontrol depending on the precise amounts and delays of reinforcement Requests for reprints should be sent to Douglas J. Navarick, Department of Psychology, P. O. Box 6846, California State University, Fullerton, CA 92834-6846. (E-mail: dnavarick@fullerton .edu). presented for choice (Navarick, 1998) . Individual differences under a given set of parameter values would be explained in terms of individuals differing in the rates at which they discount the value of the delayed reinforcer (Johnson & Bickel, 2002) .
There are two fundamentally different approaches to investigating human choice between immediate and delayed reinforcers: modification of choice responses through operant conditioning and recording of choices on questionnaires that describe prospective outcomes. Generally, both types of research show decreasing preference for a reinforcer as a function of its delay. However, the rates at which preference decreases are so much slower in questionnaire studies that one may reasonably ask whether questionnaires and operant procedures measure the same discounting process. A comparison of discounting rates across selected questionnaire and operant experiments suggests that the difference in rates is due partly to whether or not a reinforcer is presented and partly to the nature of the reinforcer. The analysis suggests that incorporating a reinforcement procedure into questionnaire tasks could make it easier to interpret questionnaire results within a behavioral framework.
In operant experiments the participant repeatedly makes choices between two reinforcement schedules, the reinforcer being a stimulus that is "consumed" when administered so that it is functionally analogous to food reinforcers in studies with pigeons. Examples of such reinforcers are cessation of noise (Navarick, 1982) , a video game (Millar & Navarick, 1984) , slides of celebrities (Navarick, 1986 (Navarick, , 1987 , various kinds of videos (Navarick, 1996) , and animated cartoons (Navarick, 1998 (Navarick, , 2001 . Amount of reinforcement is defined as the duration of the reinforcer and delay of reinforcement as the time between the choice response and onset of the reinforcer. For example, in the studies with cartoon reinforcers , the schedule representing impulsivity was immediate presentation of the cartoon for 15 s followed by 75 s of waiting, and the schedule representing self-control was a delay of 55 s followed by presentation of the cartoon for 25 s and then 10 additional s of waiting (total schedule durations were equalized at 90 s). Approximately 40% of participants exhibited consistent impulsive choices and 40% consistent self-controlled choices across two sessions, with 40 free-choice trials per session (Navarick, 1998) .
Questionnaires typically describe hypothetical dollar amounts of reinforcement and delays to delivery measured in days, weeks, or months rather than seconds. Although participants may be instructed that a random percentage of choices will be paid in cash after the session, all the choices are made before the money is received, so logically the payments cannot influence the choices by acting as reinforcers. The questionnaire procedure used by Johnson and Bickel (2002) will be described in detail as their findings are the focus of this paper.
Indifference pOints between immediate, small and delayed, large dollar amounts were estimated by adjusting the smaller amount up and down until neither alternative was chosen consistently. Each participant seNed in two conditions, one in which the outcomes were hypothetical and one in which the outcomes were potentially real, with the chosen amounts paid after the session at the delay that had been specified for that alternative. Participants were informed that only a few, randomly selected trials within the real condition would qualify for payment. For the n9al condition, the large amounts were $10, $25, $100, and $250. For each amount, five delays were studied: 1 day, 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, and 6 months. The hypothetical condition included all of these alternatives plus two higher amounts, $1,000 and $2,500, and several longer delays, 1 year, 5 years, and 25 years. The two alternatives were displayed simultaneously as short descriptions on a laptop screen, for example, "$5 now" on the left and "$10 in 1 week" on the right (p. 130). The choice response was a single mouse-click on the button containing the description. Trials were presented at 2-s intervals within a single session.
Given a choice between $10 now and $10 in 1 week, one presumably would choose $10 now, an indication that the present subjective value of the delayed amount was less than $10. But how much less? If the choice was between $1 now and $10 in a week, and the delayed amount were chosen, we would know that the present value was higher than $1 but lower than $10. By offering a succession of amounts between $1 and $10, we may eventually find or be able to estimate an immediate amount, say, $8, that was equally preferred to the delayed amount, that is, chosen about half the time. This would mean that the $10 had lost $2 of its value due to the 1-week delay. A major objective of delay discounting studies is to determine the best mathematical description of this decline in present value as the delay to delivery of the reinforcer increases.
The most widely supported discounting model represents the present value of an amount as a hyperbolic function of its delay (Ainslie, 1975; Mazur, 1987) :
where A is the undiscounted (nominal) amount of reinforcement, VA is the present, discounted value, 0 is the delay to delivery of the reinforcer, and k is a free parameter that represents the individual's discounting rate. With higher values of k, the effect of a given delay is amplified. The value, k, is assumed to be constant across delays but studies indicate it varies inversely with amount, that is, smaller amounts lose value faster across delays than larger amounts (e .g., Green, Myerson, & Mcfadden, 1997) . This "magnitude effect" will later be discussed as a potential bridge between questionnaire and operant research.
The hyperbolic model describes the choice behavior of both nonhumans and humans. It contrasts with an exponential decay model favored by economic theory based on the assumption that probability of reinforcement (or risk of loss) is constant over time, so that as time passes, the present value of a delayed amount will decrease at a constant rate (Green et aI., 1997) . In comparison, the hyperbolic model describes a faster rate of decline at relatively short delays and a slower rate of decline at longer delays. Johnson and Bickel's (2002) data were better described by the hyperbolic than by the exponential function. In addition, it was found that k values (discounting rates) increased as the amount of the delayed reinforcer decreased (the magnitude effect), and discounting rates were the same for real and hypothetical amounts.
Comparison of k Values
The discounting rates observed in questionnaire studies are much too low to explain the impulsive choice found in operant experiments. In the experiment mentioned earlier that used cartoons as the reinforcer (Navarick, 1998) , almost half the participants consistently chose an immediate 15-s reinforcer over a 25-s reinforcer delayed 55 sec. Theoretically, at the moment of choice, the discounted value of the delayed reinforcer was less than 15 s, less than 60% of the nominal amount. In Johnson and Bickel's (2002) experiment, it would have taken about 70 days for $1 0 to drop to 60% of its nominal amount (p. 134, Figure 1 ). In a comparable questionnaire study by Green et al. (1997) , it took a hypothetical 3 years for $100 to drop to 60% of its original value (p. 717, Table 1 ). The k values that produced such shallow discounting would leave a 25-s cartoon reinforcer virtually undiscounted over a 55-s delay.
From Equation 1, calculations show that the k value needed to reduce a 25-s reinforcer to 15 s-the amount of the immediate, small reinforcer-is about 109,000 times greater than that required to reduce $10 to $6 in the Johnson and Bickel (2002) experiment. They measured delay in days. To make the calculations comparable, the 55-s delay was converted to a proportion of a day, 55/86400 seconds = .0006365 days, resulting in a k of 1046.35. From Johnson and Bickel's Table 1 on p. 140, one finds a median k of .0096 for the $10 amount. This value of k results in a discounted amount of $6 in 70 days.
Two salient procedural differences potentially contributed to the difference in k values. One was the presence or absence of a reinforcement process: Only in the operant procedure did a reinforcer follow choice responses in a way that could influence subsequent choices. Another difference was the types of reinforcers used, consumable versus nonconsumable. The videos were reinforcing because they produced observing behavior that functioned as a form of consummatory behavior, which made the use of a backup reinforcer unnecessary. Money is not generally considered to be a consumable reinforcer but rather a reinforcer that derives value from the consumption of other commodities. The relative contributions of reinforcement and consumption processes can be assessed by considering an operant choice study by Hyten, Madden, and Field (1994) that used pOints and money as reinforcers in a self-control procedure. Comparing their results to Johnson and Bickel's, one can estimate the effect of presenting money as a reinforcer versus describing money as a future outcome. Comparing Navarick's (1998) results to those of Hyten et ai., one can estimate the effect of presenting consumable versus nonconsumable reinforcers.
The Reinforcement Effect
In the study by Hyten et ai., 6 college students responded for points exchangeable for cash at a rate of 2 cents per point. A single key press initiated a schedule. In the point-delay condition, an impulsive choice produced 5 points immediately whereas a self-controlled choice produced 10 points after a delay of 15, 30, or 60 s, with the points earned from both schedules exchanged for cash immediately after the session. The intertrial interval was held constant at 75 s to avoid a confound between delay and rate of point delivery. In the exchange-delay condition, both schedules provided their respective numbers of points immediately but points earned from impulsive choices were exchanged for cash immediately after the session whereas points earned from self-controlled choices were exchanged after delays of 1 day, 3 weeks, or 6 weeks. It was found that when point delays were manipulated , all 6 participants conSistently made self-controlled choices at all delay durations. When exchange delays were manipulated, all of the participants showed 100% self-controlled choices at the 1-day delay but 4 participants eventually showed 100% impulsive choices when the delay associated with self-controlled choices was at least 3 weeks. For these 4 participants, a range of possible k values can be determined for the indifference point between the immediate, small and delayed , larger reinforcers. By comparing this range to the k of .0096 found by Johnson and Bickel for the $10 amount, one can estimate the effect of delivering versus describing monetary reinforcers.
On each trial the choice was between 10 cents to be received at the end of the session and 20 cents to be received after a delay. The 20-cent reinforcer was preferred at a delay of 1 day but the 10-cent reinforcer was preferred at 21 days. The indifference point would therefore be at a delay greater than 1 day but less than 21 days. Indifference at 1 day would result in a k of 1.00 whereas indifference at 21 days would result in a k of .0476. So for the 4 impulsive participants, the 20-cent reinforcer was discounted at a rate greater than .0476 but less than 1.00. Compared to Johnson and Bickel's .0096, delay discounting in the operant procedure was 5 to 100 times faster. A portion of this difference is explainable in terms of the magnitude effect mentioned earlier: Discounting rates tend to increase as dollar amounts decrease. In Johnson and Bickel's study, median k values increased by a factor of 10 as amounts decreased by a factor of 250 from $2500 to $10 (p. 138, Figure 5 ). By comparison, in an experiment involving larger amounts by Green et al. (1997) , median kvalues increased only by a factor of 3 as amounts decreased by a factor of ~~50 from $25000 to $100 (p. 719, Figure 2 ). Both within and across these experiments, k values increased in a positively accelerated fashion as amounts decreased. A simple linear extrapolation of k values from Johnson and Bickel's results to those of Hyten et al. could thus be seen as a conservative estimate. Going from $10 to $.20, a factor of 50, k values would increase by a factor of 2, resulting in a k of .0192. Thus, allowing for the magnitude effect, one could reasonably estimate that the discounting rate for monetary reinforcers in the operant procedure was 2.5 to 50 times faster than it was in the questionnaire procedure. In contrast, the discounting rate for video reinforcement was over 100,000 times faster.
In addition to this comparison across studies, evidence from manipulations within the Hyten et al. study indicates that exposure to delayed reinforcement increases sensitivity to delay. Two participants (Subjects 1 and 4, p. 230) did not show consistent impulsivity on initial exposure to the 3-week delay but did so after exposure to the 1-day delay followed by the 6-week delay. Both participants were consistently impulsive on their initial exposure to the 6' -week delay. The other 2 participants (Subjects 3 and 5) were consistently impulsive on initial exposure to the 3-week delay but this condition followed exposure to the 1-day delay. Hyten et al. noted that "it may be that exposure to the 1-day exchange delay alters subsequent reaction to the longer delays (p. 231 )." A likely reason is that reinforcers delayed by 1 day preceded choices in later sessions but reinforcers delayed by 3 weeks necessarily preceded fewer choices (possibly none for most participants) because there was only an average of 19 daily sessions (ranging from 16 to 22, Table 1, p. 229) in which choices could be made. The 1-day delay ensured that a reinforcement effect could influence subsequent choices.
Further evidence for an effect of delayed reinforcement comes from the 2 remaining participants who did not exhibit consistent impulsive choice (Subjects 2 and 6). Their initial exchange delay was 6 weeks, which was probably too long for the delayed payments to have an opportunity to influence choices within this condition by acting as reinforcers. Instead, the payments acted as prospective outcomes . The number of points offered for impulsive choices (originally 5) was increased until the immediate reinforcer was consistently chosen. For Subject 2, this reversal occurred at 10 points (equal to the delayed reinforcer) and for Subject 6 it occurred at 9 points. Indifference would theoretically occur between 9 and 10 for Subject 2 and between 8 and 9 for Subject 6. The k values for 9.5 points and 8.5 points would be .0013 and .0042, respectively, which are comparable to the .0096 value obtained by Johnson and Bickel with prospective reinforcers.
In summary, when choice responses are followed by delayed reinforcement, subsequent choice responses appear to show increased sensitivity to delay. Presentations of immediate reinforcement (i.e., immediately after the session) may also be a factor. All participants in the study by Hyten et al. (1994) initially received training in which choice responses immediately produced 5 or 10 points, and the points from both schedules were exchanged for cash immediately after the session. Enhanced sensitivity to delay could have resulted from the contrast between the immediate and 1-day exchanges. There is an implication here for questionnaire research : Delay sensitivity could be enhanced by preexposing partiCipants to immediate and delayed presentations of monetary reinforcers after corresponding choices on questionnaires. A delay of 1 day may be sufficient. This preexposure procedure would also provide a means of interpreting choices for prospective outcomes in terms of reinforcement and other behavioral concepts, a point discussed further at the end of the paper.
The Consumption Effect
Sensitivity to delay was over 100,000 times greater in Navarick's (1998) experiment than it was in Johnson and Bickel's (2002) . The foregoing analysis suggests that only a small portion of that difference was caused by reinforcement per se. A more important factor appears to be the nature of the reinforcer. The kvalue for cartoon videos was at least 1,000 times greater than the k values for money in the study by Hyten et al. (1994) . However, the greater sensitivity for cartoons may partly be due to the magnitude effect rather than to consumption per se. It is easy to imagine that a 25-s cartoon video would be a weaker reinforcer than the presentation of points exchangeable for 20 or 30 cents immediately after the session. For example , participants may prefer immediate presentation of points followed by a 90-s waiting period over immediate presentation of the cartoon for 25 s followed by a 65-s waiting period. On that basis alone one would expect faster delay discounting for cartoons than for money. But the 1,000-fold discrepancy in discounting rates far exceeds the changes in k typically found for different amounts of money (Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Green et aI. , 1997) . It seems reasonable to conclude that consumption of the reinforcer played a major role in enhancing sensitivity to delay.
The consumable reinforcers previously studied in a self-control context had in common the characteristic that they produced consummatory behavior that was intrinsically rEllated to the reinforcer, such as observing behavior. A promising alternative approach is to create a laboratory analogue to a natural environment in which a consumable reinforcer is obtained but to administer a nonconsumable reinforcer and associate it with it an artificial consummatory response . Within the simulated environment, the nonconsumable reinforcer can produce sensitivity to delay comparable to that found with consumable reinforcers (ct. Navarick, Bernstein, & Fantino, 1990, p. 159) .
A simulated internet shopping mall was created by Rajala and Hantula (2000) to investigate effects of the delay between key presses and an informational reinforcer that was required to complete a shopping task. Eight college students were asked to play the role of a buyer of audio CDs for a disk jockey company. Prior to each of 10 sessions they were given a typed list of 60 actual CD titles with artists' names from which they were to "purchase" 40 CDs. The participants chose among five fictitious music stores that differed in the number of seconds they took after a CD's code number was entered to indicate whether or not the selected title was in stock. The delays were 0.5, 2, 4, 8, and, 16 s, and the probability of a CD being in stock was .8 for all stores. If a CD was in stock, the participants could purchase it by clicking a button , after which they crossed the title off their list. Clicking the purchase button and crossing off the title served as consummatory responses to the display indicating that the CD was in stock.
Participants shopped in a successive-choice procedure similar to that used in operant research on foraging. An initial screen displayed icons for the five stores. Clicking an icon opened the welcome page for the store, which allowed the participants to enter the code number for a CD. After a delay, a new screen appeared that indicated whether or not the CD was available. If the CD was not available, or if the participants chose not to purchase it, they were required to return to the initial screen. If they purchased the CD , they could either stay in the same store and enter another CD number or they could return to the initial screen to choose a different store. It was found that 4 of the 8 participants were sensitive to the feedback delays. The percentage of their total purchases at a store dropped from about 80 to 10 as the delay to receiving notification about a CD increased from 0.5 to 2 s. For these 4 participants, a hyperbolic function accounted for about 90% of the variance. This far exceeded the percentage accounted for by exponential or logarithmic equations. It is noteworthy that in choice studies involving consumable positive reinforcers, individual differences in sensitivity to delay are similarly extreme. For example, in Navarick's (1998) experiment, 40% of participants were consistently impulsive and 40% were consistently selfcontrolled across two sessions. Whether consumable reinforcers are presented in an artificial environment or nonconsumable reinforcers are presented in a simulated natural environment, the discounting processes appear to be similar.
Preexposure to immediate and delayed reinforcement is a common feature of all the operant procedures discussed. Participants in Rajala and Hantula's study received preliminary training in which they purchased one CD from each of the five stores, thereby sampling delays ranging from 0.5 to 16 s. Participants in the study by Hyten et al. (1994) received preliminary training with immediate exchange delays and subsequently were exposed to a 1-day delay before they showed delay sensitivity. In Navarick's procedure, each set of 20 free-choice trials was preceded by four forced choices, two for the immediate, small reinforcer and two for the delayed, large reinforcer. In questionnaire research, analogous preexposure to immediate and delayed reinforcement could bring k values closer to those found with monetary reinforcement in operant research. It could also make the results easier to interpret in terms of behavioral concepts, as discussed below.
Integrating Questionnaire Research into a Behavioral Framework
Prospective outcomes are not reinforcers. How, then, could one interpret the delay effects found in questionnaire experiments in terms of delayed reinforcement? Probably the strongest argument for a connection with behavioral concepts is the fact that both human and animal choice data are better described by a hyperbolic function than by an exponential function. But the same type of function could result from different processes in humans and nonhumans, or in humans responding in different procedures. For example, in management science the leading interpretation of delay discounting is based on the psychophysics of temporal judgments (Chapman, 2003; Prelec & Lowenstein, 1991) . As with many physical dimensions, sensitivity to changes in time (e.g., 1 day versus 21 days) is said to decrease as the absolute magnitudes increase (e.g ., 301 days versus 321 days). The hyperbolic function gives greater weight to differences at shorter delays than at longer delays but it does not follow that the function resulted from the kind of delay discounting that occurs in operant conditioning. Interpreting questionnaire choices in terms of reinforcement could be made more plausible if participants were preexposed to immediate and delayed reinforcers as a result of choices they made. Their responses to subsequent questions describing prospective outcomes could then be interpretE~d in terms of verbally mediated stimulus generalization from the questions to which they previously responded.
Questionnaires have become a common method of investigating delay discounting in a behavioral framework. The presumption that questionnaire choices reflect behavioral processes requires critical examination. Questionnaire choices are operant responses but questionnaires do not influence those responses through operant conditioning. The present analysis indicates that the absence of reinforcement and consumption processes results in much slower delay discounting than that found in operant choice procedures. A hybrid procedure combining reinforcement with questions about prospective reinforcers potentially bridges the gap between two parallel research traditions.
